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INTRODUCTION 
Local government scholars have paid significant attention to local 
“innovation” in the sphere of regulatory policy.1  And for good 
 
* This Article was written for and presented at an early stage at the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal’s Fortieth Anniversary Symposium in February 2013. 
† Associate Professor, Willamette University College of Law.  Thanks to Kathleen 
Morris; Susan Block-Lieb; Nestor Davidson; Timothy Harrington, Deputy General 
Counsel of the Boston Public Health Commission; and Jennifer Evert for comments 
on drafts and helpful advice.  Daniel Vall-Llobera and Joanna Fluckey provided 
outstanding research assistance. 
 1. “Regulatory policy” as used here means governmental policy that regulates 
economic, professional, or environmental behavior. See GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY 
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reason.  Many of these local innovations diffuse both horizontally, to 
other cities and counties, and vertically, to the state and federal levels, 
thus profoundly impacting the nation’s regulatory landscape.2  Local 
government scholars have devoted less effort to analyzing the form of 
these regulations,3 often presuming that local law derives from 
ordinances passed by the general governing (and, usually, legislative) 
body of a city or county.4  As a result, to the extent that scholarship 
considers the actors involved in formulating local policy, it usually 
focuses on elected officials like city councilors and mayors.5  This 
Article highlights another, increasingly important source of local 
regulation: administrative rulemaking.  Particularly in the realm of 
public health, cities have adopted many high-profile and innovative 
regulatory policies by administrative rule rather than by council-
enacted ordinance.6  Despite the increased importance of local 
 
DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA 64 n.4 (2010).  For political scientists, “regulatory 
policy” is a category of government action distinct from “morality” or “governance” 
policy, each of which also seeks to “codify or alter behavior through regulatory 
regimes.” Id.  For examples of local government law scholars analyzing local policy—
including regulatory policy—innovation, see, e.g., Richard Briffault, Home Rule for 
the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259–60 (2004); Paul Diller, Intrastate 
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114–17 (2007) [hereinafter Diller, Intrastate]; 
Matthew Parlow, Progressive Policy-making on the Local Level: Rethinking 
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375–82 
(2008). 
 2. See Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1119–22. 
 3. Cf. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for 
Scholars and Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 793 (2012) (“[N]early all policy 
diffusion studies explore legislative adoption by state or national governments, while 
ignoring the equally important decisions made by executive agencies.”). 
 4. These ordinances are sometimes called “bylaws.”  The nomenclature is not 
important.  In cities or towns, it is usually the elected council (which may have a 
different name, like board of selectmen or board of aldermen) that has the authority 
to enact ordinances.  At the county level, the governing legislative body is usually a 
board of commissioners, but in some states has a more idiosyncratic name like 
“commissioners court” or “board of chosen freeholders.” See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 
V, § 18(b) (“County Commissioners Court . . . shall exercise such powers and 
jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by [law] . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
40:20-1 (2013) (“The property, finances and affairs of every county shall be managed, 
controlled and governed by . . . ‘the board of chosen freeholders’ . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION & LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY (2011) (focusing on the local legislative process); see also David 
Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?  The 
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007) (arguing that the lack of partisan 
competition in city council elections leads to “unrepresentative and uncreative” 
government in big cities). 
 6. For convenience this Article will refer only to “cities” even when the 
reference could just as easily, and correctly, include counties. 
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administrative rulemaking, scant scholarship—either in local 
government or administrative law—has wrestled with the doctrinal 
and normative questions flowing therefrom.7 
The recent litigation challenging New York City’s cap on portion 
sizes of sugar-sweetened beverages—inaccurately called a “soda 
ban”—has brought the issue of local administrative rulemaking to the 
fore.8  Although the city’s Board of Health promulgated the portion-
cap rule, it was heavily promoted by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
is therefore frequently identified with him in the popular media.9  
This article uses the New York City portion-cap rule, or the 
“Bloomberg soda rule,” as well as public health regulations more 
generally, as a prism through which to analyze the distinctive 
characteristics of the local administrative process.  Part I highlights 
cities’ impressive record of administrative regulation in the public 
health realm, surveying key regulatory policies that exceeded the 
federal and state regulatory floors in attempting to reduce tobacco 
use and obesity.  Part II considers the intriguing doctrinal questions 
that arise when an agency of a city, which itself is an agent of the 
state, makes rules with the force of law, and how these questions have 
been addressed in the New York City portion-cap litigation and 
elsewhere. 
 
 7. But see BERNIE BURRUS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
(1963).  Burrus focuses primarily on the licensing decisions of local agencies.  Of 
course, much scholarship has focused on zoning boards, which are often local 
agencies.  Generally speaking, legal commentators have not painted zoning boards in 
a very flattering light. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson et al., A Study of American 
Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. 
LAW. 689, 692–97 (2008) (explaining common institutional designs for zoning boards 
in local jurisdictions); id. at 690 (noting that zoning boards are often less than neutral 
and “make land use decisions based on extra-legal factors,” thus “undermining their 
legitimacy”). 
 8. Indeed, as evidenced by recent blog postings, the portion-cap case has 
prompted a handful of legal academics to ponder seriously the issue of local 
administrative law.  See, e.g., Rick Hills, Why Did Bloomberg’s Soda Portion Ban 
Bite the Dust?  Was it Mayoral Imperialism, Judicial Activism, or Both?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 11, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2013/03/bloombergs-soda-portion-ban-bites-the-dust-defeat-for-an-imperial-mayor-
or-victory-for-activist-judg.html; Ethan Leib, Local Separation of Powers?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 15, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2013/03/local-separation-of-powers-.html; Aaron Saiger, Non-
delegation, now available in 32-ounce sizes, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 12, 2013, 
1:28 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/03/nondelegation-now-
available-in-32-ounce-sizes.html. 
 9. See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
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Part III then addresses the compelling normative and theoretical 
questions raised by city administrative agencies’ aggressive record in 
the public health sphere.  Municipal regulation of the tobacco, food, 
and soda industries beyond the federal and state regulatory floors 
presents a challenge to the standard “public-choice” narrative of 
administrative action, which suggests that agencies are likely to be 
influenced, if not co-opted, by the powerful industries they are 
supposed to regulate.  In addition to industry opposition, some local 
public health regulations, like New York City’s portion-cap rule,10 
have aroused significant popular disapproval.  To explain this sort of 
unpopular—perhaps even elitist—rulemaking, Part III turns to 
Woodrow Wilson’s writings, as a political scientist, on administrative 
agencies.  Wilson idealized agencies as apolitical, expert promulgators 
of “scientific” regulations that would benefit the public good.  In the 
decades since, academics have widely lampooned Wilson’s vision as 
naïve, more often viewing agency work as the product of interest-
group influence.  Part III explains why recent rulemaking by local 
administrative agencies strives to fit the Wilsonian mold.  The Article 
concludes by assessing the legal challenge and “cultural attack” on 
the New York City portion-cap rule within the Wilsonian framework.  
Without a general acceptance of the legitimacy of expert-driven 
rulemaking, proposals like the portion-cap rule will be difficult to 
sustain. 
I.  CITIES’ RECORDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING IN 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
In the last two decades, local governments have been particularly 
eager to take on significant public health problems—particularly 
tobacco use and obesity.11  With respect to tobacco use, cities have led 
in the enactment of clean indoor air policies,12 spearheading a 
movement that eradicated second-hand smoke for tens of millions of 
Americans in public spaces like stores, restaurants, and bars.13  Most 
 
 10. See infra note 30. 
 11. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of 
Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7–25) 
[hereinafter Diller, Innovate]. 
 12. Id. at 11–13; Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The 
Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 
829 (2006) (noting that more than 1600 local governments had passed laws in the area 
of clean indoor air policy). 
 13. See Comprehensive Smoke-Free Laws, 50 Largest U.S. Cities—2000 and 
2012, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 914 (2012) (concluding that among 
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of these regulations were enacted by ordinance, but in some 
instances, local health agencies promulgated administrative rules 
mandating smoke-free environments.14  For example, the Boston 
public health authority and a number of other, smaller Massachusetts 
municipalities prohibited smoking in indoor public places by 
administrative rule, a practice sanctioned by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in 2001.15  In West Virginia and Michigan, 
county public health agencies expanded the scope of the state’s 
smoke-free workplace law to cover all indoor public places, which 
their respective state high courts upheld.16  In other jurisdictions, 
however, local health agencies either doubted their own authority to 
regulate indoor smoking,17 or had their regulations invalidated by the 
courts.18  As secondhand smoke regulation continues to evolve—
covering additional places like parks, residential buildings, and 
 
the fifty largest cities in the United States, the number that were covered by 
comprehensive smoke-free laws increased from one in 2000 to thirty in 2012). 
 14. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at tbl. 2 (surveying smoke-free workplace 
policies of the top twenty-five cities by population and finding that of thirteen 
adopted, eleven were by ordinance, one by voter initiative, and one by administrative 
regulation). 
 15. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37 (2001) 
(upholding the Barnstable health board’s “absolute” prohibition on smoking in bars 
and restaurants); Clean Air Works Workplace Smoking Restrictions, Bos. Pub. 
Health Comm’n [hereinafter BPHC], (Dec. 9, 2002) (restricting smoking in enclosed 
workplaces). 
 16. See McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009) (upholding 
multi-county public health agency rule); Found. for Indep. Living v. Cabell-
Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d 744 (W. Va. 2003) (upholding county-city 
public health agencies’ clean indoor air regulations). 
 17. See Sandi Doughton, Pierce County Adopts Sweeping Ban on Smoking; Legal 
Fight Ahead, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/ 
2001807047_smokeban040.html (noting that King County considered a smoking ban 
but “backed off after lawyers concluded [it] lacked the authority” to adopt one). 
 18. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. Ass’n, v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 178 
F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (invalidating county health agency rule restricting 
smoking in public places); Leonard v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 105 F. Supp. 
2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Health, 
773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 2002) (holding that local health board lacked the authority to 
prohibit smoking in all indoor public spaces); Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce 
Cnty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985 (Wash. 2005) (invalidating indoor smoking ban 
promulgated by county health board because it conflicted with state law). 
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outdoor areas19—some local health agencies continue to be at the 
vanguard of regulation.20 
In addition to smoking bans, local health agencies have sought to 
clamp down on tobacco use through other regulatory methods.  When 
numerous cities banned outdoor tobacco advertising in the 1990s, 
mostly by ordinance, others addressed the issue by health agency 
rule.21  More recently, Boston and numerous other Massachusetts 
municipalities banned the sale of cigarettes in pharmacies through 
rules issued by their boards of health, and Boston’s board of health 
also banned the sale of cigar wraps.22  In 2009, New York City’s Board 
of Health issued a rule requiring retailers selling cigarettes to display 
graphic warning posters near the area of sale.23  Each of these rules 
sought to tighten the regulatory regime applicable to the tobacco 
industry and its affiliates within a particular jurisdiction. 
With respect to combating obesity, evidence from big cities shows 
that food retail regulations have been implemented by administrative 
rule more frequently than tobacco restrictions.24  New York City’s 
Board has been particularly aggressive in the last decade.  It was the 
first governmental entity in the United States to ban the use of 
artificial trans fats in restaurant foods,25 and the first to require menu 
labels at franchise restaurants to post calorie counts on menu 
boards.26  Soon after New York City’s action, many other cities and 
counties adopted similar regulations, with some doing so by 
 
 19. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing such “third-generation” 
smoke-free regulations). 
 20. See, e.g., Clean Air Works Workplace Smoking Restrictions, BPHC (Dec. 11, 
2008) (extending workplace smoking ban to include adjacent outdoor areas like 
patios). 
 21. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that of the top twenty-five 
cities in population, nine adopted outdoor advertising restrictions by ordinance, while 
one—Seattle—lay within a jurisdiction whose city-county health authority adopted 
restrictions by administrative rule). 
 22. See Local Legislative Efforts by State, TOBACCOFREERX.COM, http://www. 
tobaccofreerx.com/local_efforts.html (follow “Local Efforts” hyperlink) (listing 
restrictions adopted by Massachusetts municipalities); Regulation Restricting the 
Sale of Tobacco Products in the City of Boston, BPHC (Dec. 11, 2008). 
 23. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 181.19 (2012).  The Second Circuit ruled that the New 
York City Board’s rule was preempted by federal law. See 23-34 94th St. Grocery 
Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 24. Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 61. 
 25. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2012). 
 26. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120–21 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (discussing the original N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.50, adopted in 2006, 
and subsequent changes thereto). 
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administrative rule rather than by local ordinance.  As in the tobacco 
context, Boston and other Massachusetts municipalities banned trans 
fats administratively rather than by ordinance.27  Other notable 
jurisdictions include King County, Washington, whose Board of 
Health adopted both menu labeling and trans fat regulations by 
administrative rule,28 and Nashville-Davidson County, whose Board 
of Health adopted a menu labeling rule that was later preempted by 
the state legislature.29 
Perhaps the highest-profile obesity prevention policy adopted by 
an administrative agency is New York City’s portion-cap rule, which 
was supposed to take effect in March 2013, but is currently stayed by 
court order.30  Aimed at reducing the consumption of sugary drinks 
like soda in order to prevent obesity and other health problems, the 
rule would have capped the size of containers in which sugary 
beverages could be served in certain retail settings.31  No other 
jurisdiction has yet adopted a similar rule, but others expressed 
interest before the litigation achieved its success to date.32 
 
 27. See A Regulation to Restrict Foods Containing Artificial Trans Fats in the 
City of Boston, BPHC (Mar. 13, 2008); see also, e.g., Katheleen Conti, Bans on Trans 
Fats Coming in New Year, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/ 
local/articles/2011/11/06/lynn_bans_trans_fats_chelsea_could_be_next/ (describing 
efforts of Lynn and Chelsea boards of health to ban trans fats); NEEDHAM HEALTH 
DEP’T, TOWN OF NEEDHAM TRANS FAT BAN, (2009), available at 
http://www.needhamma.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2422 (noting that 
Needham town board of health promulgated trans fat ban in March 2009); Trans Fat 
Policy, CAMBRIDGE PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, http://www.cambridgepublichealth.org/ 
policy-practice/trans_fat_policy/index.php (last updated Sept. 2010) (noting that the 
Cambridge health department adopted a rule banning trans fats in July 2008). But 
see David Abel & John M. Guilfoil, Brookline OKs Trans Fat Ban, BOS. GLOBE, 
June 1, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/06/01/brookline_oks_ 
trans_fat_ban/ (recounting Brookline’s adoption of trans fat ban by town meeting). 
 28. KING COUNTY, WASH., BD. OF HEALTH CODE § 5.10.016 (2013) (menu 
labeling); id. § 5.10.035 (restricting artificial trans fats). 
 29. 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts 614 (overriding Nashville rule) (codified at TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 68-14-303 (2013)); Jenny Upchurch, Nashville Restaurants Ordered to Post 
Calories, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 6, 2009  (noting that the city-county health department 
issued the rule). 
 30. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2013), enforcement stayed by N.Y. Statewide 
Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 
N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 31. See N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53. 
 32. See Leon Stafford, Soda Wars: Cities Seek Restrictions, Taxes to Curb 
Obesity, ATL. J.-CONST. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:38 AM), http://www.ajc.com/ 
news/news/local/soda-wars-cities-seek-restrictions-taxes-to-curb-o/nS4b2/ (noting 
that officials in Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass., were considering emulating 
New York City’s portion-cap rule). 
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In a variety of instances, action first taken at the local level by an 
administrative agency has diffused “horizontally” to other 
jurisdictions, many (if not most) of which adopt the policy by 
ordinance rather than by administrative rule.  For instance, although 
New York City first adopted menu labeling as a Board-promulgated 
rule, a number of other cities and counties later adopted the same or 
similar regulation by council enactment.33  Why some cities are more 
likely to use the administrative process rather than the ordinance-
enacting process is a complicated question, and it is beyond this 
Article’s scope to propose a complete answer.  Legal doctrine, 
geographic jurisdiction, and institutional design play major roles, and 
this Article will explore these issues in some detail.  Funding, staffing, 
institutional culture, and local political culture are also relevant.  
Public health scholars have studied local agency effectiveness in 
considerable depth, sometimes considering at least some of the above 
factors, but most studies focus on service provision or overall 
effectiveness rather than the use of regulatory authority specifically.34 
In addition to their role in stimulating horizontal policy diffusion, 
local administrative agencies can stimulate vertical policy migration.  
This process occurs when a state legislature or Congress passes laws 
that mimic or borrow from the local regulations, or when higher-level 
administrative agencies promulgate their own rules emulating local 
agency rules.  Often, the migration process is a combination of both.  
For instance, after local-level adoption of menu labeling, at least five 
states passed menu labeling statutes between 2008 and 2010,35 while 
 
 33. See COLLEEN IP INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, STATE AND LOCAL MENU 
NUTRITION LABELING LEGISLATION SUMMARY (AUGUST 2011) (2011), available at 
http://www.collenip.com/services/FINAL_Menu_Labeling_Laws_Chart.pdf (listing 
seven local jurisdictions that adopted menu labeling regulations by ordinance, 
including Suffolk County, N.Y., which adopted an ordinance specifically delegating 
authority to its health board to promulgate rules on the matter). 
 34. E.g., Zhuo (Adam) Chen et al., Obesity Prevention: The Impact of Local 
Health Departments, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 603 (2013); Sandy J. Slater et al., 
Missed Opportunities: Local Health Departments as Providers of Obesity Prevention 
Programs for Adolescents, 33 AM. J. PREV. MED. S246, S247 (2007) (including 
“enacting new health regulations” as “advocacy activities” studied, but not focusing 
on them); Xinzhi Zhang et al., Obesity Prevention and Diabetes Screening at Local 
Health Departments, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1434 (2010). But see Jennifer L. 
Pomeranz, The Unique Authority of State and Local Health Departments to 
Address Obesity, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1192, 1193 (2011) (“Approximately half of 
the public health departments in the country can promulgate regulations; however, 
only approximately 17% report enacting regulations as a primary activity.”). 
 35. These states were California, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont. See 
Trans Fat and Menu Labeling Legislation, Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., 
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one state—Massachusetts—adopted a menu labeling regime by 
administrative regulation.36  In 2010, Congress included a menu 
labeling provision as part of the Affordable Care Act, although 
implementing regulations are still pending from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).37  As the menu labeling example 
demonstrates, administrative action by one or more local 
governments can constitute the crucial first step in the policy diffusion 
process; without such administrative action, certain policies might 
never make it to higher levels of government.38  The administrative 
action on the tobacco and obesity fronts is also remarkable because in 
each context, the local administrative agency is regulating to the 
detriment of politically powerful industries and their allies for the 
purpose of conferring diffuse benefits on the public, thus challenging 
the standard public-choice account of agency action, as discussed in 
Part III. 
II.  LOCAL AGENCIES’ UNIQUE DOCTRINAL FOOTING 
Per foundational federal constitutional doctrine, local governments 
are “convenient agencies,” or “creatures” of the state.39  If they serve 
city and county governments, therefore, local public health 
authorities might be seen as agencies of the state’s agencies, or agents 
“twice removed” from state control.  If, on the other hand, local 
public health agencies are seen as created directly by state law, 
independent of the local governments to which they are linked, then 
they are theoretically equivalent to local governments themselves, or 
to state agencies.  The theoretical conception of local agencies can 
 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/trans-fat-and-menu-labeling-legislation. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 36. See 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 590.009(G) (2013); see also Jason Szep, 
Massachusetts Sets Tough Fast-food Menu Rules, REUTERS (May 13, 2009), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/food-massachusetts-idUKN13413157200 
90513 (describing Massachusetts’s menu-labeling rules as toughest in the United 
States because they applied to menu labels on drive-through boards as well). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573-77 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 343(q)(5) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). 
 38. See Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1129 (citing Roderick M. Hills, Against 
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007)). But see Shipan & Volden, supra note 12, at 827, 840 
(finding evidence to support the proposition that, in states with low levels of 
legislative professionalism, local enactment of a policy can release pressure on the 
state legislature to adopt a similar policy). 
 39. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); cf. Washington v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982) (describing local school boards as 
“creatures of the state”). 
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have practical implications.  If local agencies are city sub-agents, then 
they should be subject to direct city control much like state and 
federal administrative agencies are (usually) subject to control by the 
legislatures that created them and whose laws they “enforce.”40  
Moreover, if local agencies are city creatures, then their powers 
should be as great as—and no greater than—the power of the cities 
they serve.  By contrast, if agencies are direct creatures of the state, 
the extent of their powers should be circumscribed by state law only.  
As the ensuing discussion shows, there is some variation in how states 
frame the powers of local agencies. 
A. State or Local Source of Power 
Most state courts that have analyzed the scope of local health 
agency powers have looked primarily, if not exclusively, to state law.  
For instance, in Massachusetts, the courts routinely cite the state 
delegation statute, which simply declares that “[b]oards of health may 
make reasonable health regulations,” as the font of broad authority 
for local regulations.41  Relying on this provision, Massachusetts 
courts have upheld a variety of local health agency rules regulating 
smoking or tobacco distribution more strictly than state law.42  In 
doing so, the courts have not concerned themselves with the extent of 
the city’s powers, despite the fact that local charters also address local 
health agencies and some charters reserve the right to abolish the 
agencies and appoint their officers.43  Massachusetts municipalities 
 
 40. Some agencies at the federal level are designed to have more institutional 
independence from the executive, see generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769 (2013) (reviewing and analyzing the distinction between “independent” and 
“executive” agencies), but Congress retains the authority to legislatively override a 
rule promulgated by even an independent agency. 
 41. See, e.g., Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 41 
(Mass. 2001) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31). 
 42. E.g., Am. Lithuanian Naturalization Club, Athol, Mass. v. Bd. of Health of 
Athol, 844 N.E.2d 231, 238 (Mass. 2005) (upholding regulation prohibiting smoking 
in enclosed areas of membership associations); Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 
Yarmouth Lodge # 2270 v. Bd. of Health of Yarmouth, 790 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Mass. 
2003) (upholding regulation prohibiting smoking “in all food service establishments, 
lounges, and bars”); Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 41 
(Mass. 2001) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31) (upholding Barnstable 
regulation that prohibited indoor smoking); RYO Cigar Ass’n v. Bos. Pub. Health 
Comm’n, 950 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding BPHC’s ban on the sale 
of cigar wraps). 
 43. E.g., CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, MASS. §§ 2-4 & 5-1, available 
at http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/TownManager/charter_current.pdf. 
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enjoy reasonably broad home rule, at least with respect to regulatory 
matters, so the issue of authority has remained academic because 
none of the litigated cases involved an expressed disagreement 
between an elected governing body of a locality and its board of 
health.44  In Boston and Cambridge, as explained below, state law 
expressly delegates power directly to public health agencies that are 
largely independent of those cities.45 
The Washington state courts have also looked to state law as the 
source of local health agency powers, and, in doing so, purport to 
uphold local rules so long as they do not conflict with state law.  For 
instance, in considering a challenge to the Tacoma-Pierce County 
Health Department’s ban on smoking in all public accommodations 
in the county (a rule that went beyond the strictures of state law at 
the time) the court noted that the Department’s authority derived 
“solely from statutory delegation.”46  Although the specific statutory 
delegation in question was quite broad, allowing health boards to 
enact “rules and regulations as are necessary in order to preserve, 
promote and improve the public health,”47 the court found the local 
antismoking rule invalid because it conflicted with state law on the 
matter.48  In applying standard “conflict” or “preemption” analysis,49 
the court ostensibly treated the agency rule like an ordinance enacted 
by a city or county legislative body.  In discussing the agency’s 
powers, however, the court noted that “[a] statutory delegation to an 
agency . . . is limited to those powers expressly granted, and if any 
doubt exists related to the granting of the power, it must be denied.”50  
 
 44. For more on Massachusetts home rule, including its application of the 
“private law exception,” see Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1127 & n.90 (2012). 
 45. See infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
 46. Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce Cnty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985, 987 
(Wash. 2005). 
 47. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.060(3)).  The court also cited a state law 
provision that directs a local health board to “[p]rovide for the control and 
prevention of any dangerous, contagious or infectious disease within the jurisdiction 
of the local health department.” Id. at 987 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.060(4)). 
 48. Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988. 
 49. In some states, “conflict” is a subcategory of preemption, whereas in others, it 
is a separate category of analysis altogether. Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1141 
n.129. 
 50. Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988.  Interestingly, in making this 
observation, the court cited a case involving the city of Seattle, Employco Personnel 
Serv. v. City of Seattle, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991), indicating that Dillon’s Rule remains 
applicable to Washington municipalities to some extent despite the common 
understanding that Washington is a home-rule state. See, e.g., Ryan M. Carson, Note, 
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Did this Dillon’s Rule-like approach to the agency’s powers affect the 
case’s outcome?51  Likely not, but in another case from a year earlier, 
Parkland Light & Water Co. v. Tacoma-Pierce County Board of 
Health, three dissenting justices hinted that county home-rule should 
have affected the analysis of a challenged agency rule.52 
In Parkland, water districts within the geographic boundaries of the 
city-county health board challenged the board’s authority to require 
them to fluoridate their water.53  A bare majority of the court found 
that the local rule (adopted as a binding “resolution”) “irreconcilably 
conflict[ed]” with a state law on the matter that established a 
procedure by which water districts could decide whether to 
fluoridate.54  The dissent, however, believed that the state law merely 
established one procedure for fluoridation that a county health board 
was free to supersede, and, therefore, there was no conflict between 
the agency’s resolution and the state law.55  In voting to uphold the 
health board’s powers, the dissent expressly noted the home-rule 
powers of the county the board served.56  While both the majority and 
the dissent purported to engage in run-of-the-mill preemption 
analysis, for the dissent, county home rule may have been a “plus 
factor” tipping the scales in favor of the validity of the board’s rule. 
If Washington shows the potential dangers to local health agencies’ 
authority when viewed as purely creatures of the state, Michigan and 
West Virginia demonstrate the opposite: agencies’ perceived 
independence of the counties they serve may result in enhanced, or at 
least more secure, powers.  For instance, Michigan counties do not 
enjoy “home rule” in the standard sense of the word.57  Yet when a 
 
Chinks in the Armor: Municipal Authority to Enact Shoreline Permit Moratoria 
After Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 184 (2007) 
(referring to Washington’s “home-rule doctrine”). 
 51. Accord 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9b, at 
93 (2d ed. New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1873); see also id. § 55, at 173. 
 52. 90 P.3d 37, 40–42 (Wash. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 38. 
 54. Id. at 40. 
 55. Id. at 40–42 (Ireland, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 41 (“The Board’s police powers arise from a statutory delegation by the 
legislature.  Pierce County is a home rule charter county.”). 
 57. See Mudge v. Macomb Cnty., 534 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“A 
county, as a political subdivision of the state, possesses only those powers delegated 
to it by constitution or statute.”) (citing Wright v. Bartz, 62 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. 
1954)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 580 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1998); see also MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 45.3 (2013) (“Each organized county shall be a body politic and 
corporate, for the following purposes, that is to say: To sue and be sued, to purchase 
and hold real and personal estate for the use of the county; to borrow money for the 
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multi-county public health agency promulgated a smoke-free rule that 
went further than Michigan’s statewide law at the time, the Michigan 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the agency’s authority to so 
regulate.58  Citing to the Michigan statutory provisions that delegated 
the power to “[a]dopt regulations to property safeguard the public 
health” to local health authorities,59 the court concluded that these 
provisions justified the Northwest Michigan Community Health 
Agency’s (NMCHA) smoke-free workplace rule.60  Under the state’s 
statutory scheme for local health agencies, the elected governing body 
(county commission) of each member county of the NMCHA had to 
approve, and did in fact approve, the proposed rule.61  (Indeed, under 
this scheme, the possibility of “conflict” between the agency and any 
constituent county was nonexistent; one dissenting county out of four, 
even if the least populous, could have vetoed the NMCHA’s rule.)  
The county commissioners were thus able to give final approval to a 
health agency rule that each commission may have had dubious 
authority to enact on its own.62 
In West Virginia, the disparity between county power and county 
health agency power is even more pronounced.  West Virginia has 
relatively weak home rule for cities, and counties possess even less 
 
purpose of erecting and repairing county buildings, and for the building of bridges, to 
make all necessary contracts, and to do all other necessary acts in relation to the 
property and concerns of the county.”).  The Michigan Constitution allows counties 
to adopt their own charters, but doing so does not confer any additional powers on 
counties; rather, the adoption of a charter primarily allows the county to reorganize 
its leadership structure. MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 2. 
 58. See McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009). 
 59. Id. at 23 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2435(d)); see also McNeil, 772 
N.W.2d at 38 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2441(1) (granting health agencies the 
power to adopt regulations “that are necessary or appropriate to implement or carry 
out the duties or functions vested by law in the local health department”)). 
 60. The NMHCA consists of Antrim, Charlevoix, Emmet, and Otsego counties. 
McNeil, 772 N.W.2d at 20.  Justice Markman and the two other dissenters agreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that the NMCHA had the authority to ban smoking in 
settings not then covered by state law, see id. at 36 (Markman, J., dissenting) (“I 
concur with the majority’s conclusion that . . . the NMCHA possessed the authority 
to adopt that part of the clean indoor air regulation that restricts smoking . . . .”), but 
disagreed regarding whether the agency could use a particular enforcement 
mechanism, id. 
 61. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2441; see also McNeil, 772 N.W.2d at 21. 
 62. Whether county commissions had the power to enact smoking regulations 
beyond the strictures of state law has not been litigated.  At least four counties 
passed ordinances that did so and none, apparently, were challenged in court. See 
Wayne Bans Smoking at Work, DET. NEWS, Mar. 18, 2005, at E1. 
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authority.63  Nonetheless, the state supreme court has upheld the 
authority of local health agencies, which are organized at the county 
or joint county-city level, to promulgate indoor air restrictions that 
are stricter than those imposed by state law.64  In doing so, the court 
has cited the state legislature’s “broad delegation of power” to local 
boards to make rules for “the promoting and maintaining of clean 
and safe air.”65  Perhaps because they enjoy substantial power, local 
boards of health have been more aggressive in regulating indoor 
smoking in West Virginia than elected local entities.66  Like Michigan, 
local elected bodies in West Virginia have the power to block the 
implementation of county rules, and at least a handful have done so.67  
But if county commissioners have the authority to initiate smoke-free 
laws, which is questionable under West Virginia home-rule doctrine, 
it appears that they prefer to let health departments move first.68 
In other states, courts have interpreted health boards’ powers 
narrowly in finding agency action unauthorized, or the state 
legislature has specifically withdrawn power from local agencies.  For 
instance, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the Toledo-Lucas 
County Board of Health lacked the authority to promulgate a rule 
banning smoking in all public places in the county.69  Despite a state 
statute seemingly granting local boards wide-ranging authority to 
“make such orders and regulations as are necessary for public 
health,”70 the court held that boards are not vested with “unlimited 
 
 63. Kenneth A. Klase, West Virginia, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA 446, 451 (Dale 
Krane et al. eds., 2001) (describing municipal home rule in West Virginia as very 
limited and observing that counties have even less authority than the “token home 
rule” afforded to cities). 
 64. E.g., Found. for Indep. Living v. Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d 
744 (W. Va. 2003). 
 65. Id. at 751 (citing W. VA. CODE R. § 16-2-11(a)(1)(ii)). 
 66. See id. at 750 n.3 (noting that the local health boards covering forty-six of the 
state’s fifty-five counties have adopted clean indoor air regulations). 
 67. See, e.g., Clark Davis, Cabell Set to Implement Smoking Plan, W. VA. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=13049 
(noting that in Berkeley and Marion Counties the elected commissioners blocked the 
health departments’ implementation of proposed antismoking regulations). 
 68. Indeed, at least one city has waited for the health department to act before 
implementing its own clean indoor air ordinance. See Stacy Moniot, Monongalia 
County Approves Smoking Ban, 12 WBOY.COM (Jan. 23, 2012 3:42 PM), 
http://www.wboy.com/story/16481526/2012/01/09/monongalia-county-approves-
smoking-ban (explaining how Morgantown deferred implementation of its city 
ordinance pending county health department’s promulgation of a rule). 
 69. D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Health, 773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 
2002). 
 70. Id. at 547 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 3709.21). 
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authority to adopt regulations addressing all public-health 
concerns.”71  Although the court recognized that “local boards of 
health are better situated than the General Assembly to protect the 
public health,” it believed that a smoking ban went too far, repeatedly 
invoking the notion that boards cannot act in “any area of public 
health,” without explaining which areas they may regulate without 
further legislative delegation.72 
Courts in New Jersey and North Carolina also found local health 
board efforts to regulate smoking invalid, albeit for more 
idiosyncratic reasons.  In New Jersey, one trial court held that a 
regional health commission lacked the power to ban smoking in 
indoor public places because the state had preempted the power to 
ban smoking unless justified as a fire safety measure; while 
municipalities may have had the authority to enact fire safety 
measures, unelected health boards did not.73  In North Carolina, the 
state appellate court relied heavily on a couple of New York state 
administrative law cases (including Boreali v. Axelrod, which has 
been featured prominently in the New York City portion-cap 
litigation74) to hold that a county health agency smoking ban 
amounted to an exercise of legislative, rather than administrative, 
power.75  Finally, in Tennessee, the state legislature responded to the 
Nashville-Davidson County health department’s attempt to require 
that calorie counts be posted on menu labels by specifically 
withdrawing the power of any “non-elected” local entity (i.e., an 
appointed board of health) to issue such rules.76 
In all of the above instances, state law was the driving force in 
determining whether a local health agency’s action was within the 
scope of its authority.  In the New York City portion-cap case, local 
law has assumed a more prominent role.  The plaintiffs challenging 
the portion-cap rule argue that the Board of Health exceeded its 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. LDM, Inc. v. Princeton Reg’l Health Comm’n, 764 A.2d 507, 523–24, 530 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000). 
 74. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).  For a discussion of Boreali 
and its role in the portion-cap litigation, see infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text. 
 75. City of Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).  
The court never actually decided whether the state had delegated the power to 
regulate smoking to a local health board; even if the state had so delegated, the court 
would have held the board’s rule unconstitutional because the board took non-
health-related criteria into account when fashioning the rule. Id. at 535. 
 76. See supra note 29. 
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delegated authority in promulgating the rule.77  They stress that the 
Board’s powers emanate from—and are circumscribed by—the city 
charter and any ensuing delegations, or lack thereof, from the city 
council.78  The City, by contrast, has sought to premise the Board’s 
powers more on state law than on local law, arguing that the Board 
exercises “plenary powers of legislation” delegated directly by the 
state legislature.79  In its recent decision, New York Statewide 
Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City 
Department of Health,80 the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court invalidated the rule, largely accepting the plaintiffs’ 
invitation to focus on the city council, rather than the state legislature, 
as the font of the Board’s powers.81 
Looming over the Appellate Division’s analysis in New York 
Statewide Coalition was the peculiar New York Court of Appeals 
precedent of Boreali v. Axelrod.82  In Boreali, the Court of Appeals 
invalidated an attempt by the Public Health Council, a state 
administrative agency, to impose smoke-free regulations that were 
more stringent than those imposed by state legislation.83  In 
invalidating the restrictions, the court held that, despite the Council’s 
seemingly broad delegated powers to “deal [with] any matter 
affecting the public health,”84 the “coalescence” of various 
“circumstances” pushed the Council’s action to the wrong side of the 
“difficult-to-define” line between “administrative rulemaking and 
legislative policymaking.”85  One such “circumstance” was that the 
state legislature had tried and failed repeatedly to pass more stringent 
 
 77.  See generally Brief of Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Respondents at 17–23, N.Y. 
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 24, 2013) (No. 
653584/12). 
 78. Id. at *5. 
 79. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 17–18, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. 
Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 24, 2013) (No. 653584/12) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 80. 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 81. Id. at 206 (“The Board of Health . . . derives its power . . . directly and solely 
from . . . the City Council.”). But see id. at 211 (also discussing “the laws of the state,” 
including “the City Charter’s Enabling Act”). 
 82. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987); see also N.Y. Statewide 
Coal., 2013 WL 3880139, at *3 (noting that the “landmark decision in Boreali” is “the 
starting point for the analysis”). 
 83. 517 N.E.2d at 1351–52. 
 84. Id. at 1353 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(a)). 
 85. Id. at 1355. 
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smoking regulations.86  This record indicated to the court that the 
Council’s rule went beyond normal “interstitial” rulemaking and 
intruded on “legislative policy-making.”87  In articulating the 
distinction between these two supposedly separate categories, the 
Boreali majority notably relied on nondelegation principles that have 
been largely disavowed at the federal level, thus making New York 
state a particularly inviting jurisdiction in which to challenge agency 
action. 
Subsequent court opinions have applied Boreali to local 
administrative agencies in New York.88  Like state agencies, therefore, 
local agencies in New York are constrained by an unusually robust 
nondelegation canon.  In the portion-cap rule case, the Appellate 
Division read the city charter with Boreali in mind, interpreting 
narrowly the city charter’s grant of authority to the Board to regulate 
“all matters affecting health in the city of New York.”89  In spite of 
this seemingly broad language, the Appellate Division limited the 
Board’s authority to protecting the public from “inherently harmful 
matters” like diseases and unsafe food.90  Ironically, the court did not 
consider the notion that obesity might be a disease.91  
Notwithstanding myriad evidence linking soda consumption to 
obesity and other health ills, the court ruled that the Board could not 
regulate soda because it is not a “health hazard per se,” but is only 
dangerous when consumed excessively.92  The Appellate Division’s 
constricted view of the Board’s authority was in significant tension 
with the Board’s record of promulgating other rules to fight obesity, 
 
 86. Id. at 1352 (citing “some 40 bills”); id. at 1356 (“[T]he agency acted in an area 
in which the Legislature had repeatedly tried—and failed—to reach agreement in the 
face of substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested 
factions.”). 
 87. Id. at 1355–56. 
 88. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. & Tavern Ass’n v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of 
Health, 178 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (invalidating county health board 
regulation restricting indoor smoking in public places on the basis of Boreali); 
Leonard v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 105 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(same); Justiana v. Niagara Cnty. Dep’t of Public Health, 45 F. Supp. 2d 236 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass’n v. Cnty. of Nassau, 965 
F. Supp. 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). 
 89. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 556. 
 90. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 91. See Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2013, at B1. 
 92. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 211. 
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like requiring calorie counts on menu boards and banning trans fats, 
which had not been challenged in court on administrative grounds.93 
Another curious element of Boreali’s reasoning that the Appellate 
Division relied on in invalidating the portion-cap rule was the record 
of legislative inaction in regulating sugar-sweetened drinks.  In 
applying this Boreali “factor,” the court focused on not just the state 
legislature’s failed attempts to regulate soda more stringently, but 
also the New York City Council’s.94  The Boreali court’s reliance on 
legislative inaction as evidence of administrative overreach is a 
dubious approach, inviting opponents of a regulation to introduce 
legislation doomed to fail to bolster legal attacks on the regulation’s 
validity.95  For this reason, the New York Court of Appeals has 
backed away from this aspect of Boreali’s reasoning in other cases.96  
Regardless, applying this prong of Boreali, as the Appellate Division 
did, at the local level puts city boards of health at a graver 
disadvantage.  Their authority may be constricted by failed legislation 
at both the state and local levels. 
The City has appealed the Appellate Division’s ruling to New 
York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals.97  The court’s assessment 
of the portion-cap rule’s validity will depend in large part on whether 
the court re-affirms Boreali’s peculiar reasoning regarding separation 
of powers under the state constitution.  To be sure, a state is not 
compelled to follow federal jurisprudence in interpreting its own 
 
 93. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.  The New York City Council 
adopted the Board’s trans fat rule as legislation post hoc, thus shielding it from a 
legal challenge similar to the one brought against the portion-cap rule. See New York 
City, N.Y., Int. No. 0517-2007 (codified at NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 17-
192 (2013)). 
 94. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 971 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (“[B]oth the City and State 
legislatures have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to target sugar sweetened 
beverages.”). 
 95. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1359 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s approach to legislative inaction “will be welcomed by opponents of all 
kinds of existing laws” who argue for constricted agency authority). 
 96. See, e.g., Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y. 1995) (rejecting the 
argument that an executive order is invalid because it is “substantially similar” to a 
bill that failed in the legislature); Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y.C. v. Higgins, 630 
N.E.2d 626, 631–32 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting relevance of twenty-seven failed attempts 
to amend a statute in deciding whether an agency’s similar interpretation of the 
statute was correct). 
 97. Chris Dolmetsch, N.Y. City Asks Top State Court to Review Large-Soda Ban, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-05/n-y-
city-asks-top-state-court-to-review-large-soda-ban.html. 
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constitution,98 but the Boreali majority relied on numerous federal 
sources in articulating the nondelegation principle supposedly 
embodied in the New York State Constitution.99  In doing so, the 
Boreali majority mistakenly considered the federal nondelegation 
doctrine alive and well even though it had been effectively interred 
for years.100  If the Court of Appeals were to deem the portion-cap 
rule within the Board’s delegated power, and not unlawful 
“legislation” per Boreali, the City must still defend the rule against 
the claim, accepted by the trial court but not specifically addressed by 
the Appellate Division, that the rule is an “arbitrary and capricious” 
exercise of administrative power.101  Part III discusses this attack on 
the rule in more depth. 
B. Institutional Design 
Most courts treat the question of whence does local health agency 
authority emanate, discussed above, as distinct from the issue of how 
an agency’s officials are chosen.  As Part III will explain, however, the 
method of choosing agency officials, and whether such officials have 
relevant professional expertise, are integrally related to the Wilsonian 
argument for the legitimacy of agency rulemaking.  State law usually 
provides at least the skeletal outline of how a health agency’s board 
should be constituted.  Many, if not most, states require the 
appointment of local health board members, although some states 
allow for them to be popularly elected, or allow an already-elected 
legislative body to also serve as a board of health. 
Before proceeding, a quick terminology note is in order.  Many 
states have local “departments” of health that also contain a “board” 
of health.  Usually, the “board” is the governing body of the 
“department,” with the authority to adopt rules that department 
officials execute.  Sometimes, the executive head of the department is 
also a member of the governing board.  For this reason, lawsuits 
 
 98. See Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance:  Vivé 
La Difference, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005). 
 99. E.g., Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353, 1355–56 (citing TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, a treatise on the federal constitution). 
 100. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1360 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
majority’s “reliance on the anachronistic nondelegation theory” that has “in the 
main” been “subsequently overruled”). 
 101. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health and Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
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challenging a “board”-adopted rule often name the “department” as 
a defendant as well.102 
In jurisdictions where health board members are appointed, the 
applicable law often requires that board members possess work 
experience or educational credentials evidencing expertise in the 
field.  Whether and to what extent appointments made by executive 
officials are subject to legislative confirmation varies.  A full survey of 
health agencies’ design is beyond the scope of this article; the 
discussion below focuses on the selection and appointment 
mechanisms for the agencies in three jurisdictions with prominent 
records of public health innovation—namely, Massachusetts (focused 
on the health boards of Boston and towns), Washington (focused on 
King County-Seattle), and New York City. 
1. Massachusetts: Towns and Boston 
Due to the variety of forms of local government in Massachusetts 
(cities, towns, villages, etc.), state law prescribes different methods of 
constituting boards of health.103  I focus here on towns and the city of 
Boston since the boards of health of each have promulgated 
noteworthy regulations restricting the use and availability of 
tobacco.104  With respect to towns, judicial decisions have upheld the 
authority of health boards in Athol, Barnstable, and Yarmouth, 
specifically, to regulate smoking.105  Massachusetts law prescribes that 
town boards of health be composed of three or more persons either 
appointed by the board of selectmen (the general governing body of 
the town) or elected directly by the town’s voters, “unless other 
provision is made by law or vote of the town.”106  In some instances, 
the board of selectmen themselves can serve as the board of health.107  
State law does not require any specific expertise of town health board 
members.  In practice, Barnstable and Yarmouth have three- and 
five-member boards of health, respectively, appointed by the board of 
 
 102. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. & Tavern Ass’n v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of 
Health, 178 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (naming both the Putnam County 
Department of Health and the Putnam County Board of Health as defendants while 
the court’s opinion primarily discusses the “Board”). 
 103. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 26, 26A-D (cities); §§ 27A, 27B (regional or 
joint boards of health) (2013); id. ch. 41 §§ 1, 1A (towns). 
 104. See supra notes 15, 22 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra note 42. 
 106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, §§ 1, 1A. 
 107. Id. § 21. 
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selectmen, while Athol has a three-member board appointed by the 
city manager.108 
The Boston Public Health Commission is a different creature 
altogether, created by a special act of the Massachusetts legislature in 
1995 as an independent agency, constituting its own political 
subdivision.109  The BPHC replaced the former Boston Department of 
Health and Hospitals.110  State law provides for a governing board 
(referred to as “the Board of Health”) of seven members, with six 
appointed by the mayor of Boston subject to city council approval; 
the seventh member is the chief executive officer of the private, 
nonprofit Boston Medical Center, who serves ex officio.111  Of the six 
mayoral appointees, two must be trustees of neighborhood health 
centers affiliated with the Medical Center, and one must be selected 
from a list of nominees proposed by “representatives of organized 
labor” appointed by the mayor.112  The three board seats that do not 
require any particular affiliation are currently filled by a physician, a 
medical doctor who is also a director of a hospital center and a 
professor at Harvard Medical School, and an associate dean at 
Boston University’s school of public health.113  All members of the 
commission serve staggered three-year terms, and may be removed 
 
 108. ATHOL, MASS., TOWN CHARTER § 5-3-9(j) (2007), available at 
http://www.athol-ma.gov/egov/docs/1228756223_273803.pdf (noting that the town 
manager has the power to appoint three members of the board of health, one of 
whom must be a “professional health practitioner”); BARNSTABLE, MASS., TOWN 
CHARTER § 10-7(k)(3) (2004) (noting that the board of selectmen appoints members 
of board of health), available at http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/TownClerk/ 
TownCode.pdf; Board of Health, TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, http://www.town. 
barnstable.ma.us/BoardOfHealth (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (listing three members 
of board); Board of Health, YARMOUTH, MASS., http://www.yarmouth.ma.us/ 
index.aspx?NID=474 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (listing five members of board). 
 109. See 1995 MASS. ACTS ch. 147 § 3(a) (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. 
§§ 2-1 to 2-15 (2013)). 
 110. Id. § 2-1(a). 
 111. Id. § 2-3(b).  The BPHC’s composition was to some extent contingent on the 
approval of a merger between Boston City Hospital and Boston University Medical 
Center, which ultimately occurred and was another major focus of the 1995 Act. See 
id. § 2-5; Our History, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, http://www.bphc.org/ 
about/bphchistory/Pages/Home.aspx (noting that in 1996, the BPHC “was formed, 
resulting from the merger of Boston City Hospital and Boston University Hospital”). 
 112. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-3(b) (2013). 
 113. See Board Member Profiles, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, 
http://www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/boardmembers/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2013) (describing members Paula Johnson, Joseph Betancourt, and Harold 
Cox). 
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by the mayor only for cause and after a public hearing.114  Members of 
the board are unpaid.115  Consistent with other boards of health in the 
state, the BPHC possesses the power to promulgate “reasonable 
health regulations not inconsistent” with state regulations or law,116 
and the Massachusetts courts have similarly interpreted this grant of 
authority broadly.117  Given that it is a separate corporate body, it is 
questionable whether BPHC regulations can be overruled by the 
Boston city council.  Like Boston, Cambridge also has an 
independent public health commission that was established by state 
statute and that has at times also been a leader in public health 
regulation.118 
2. New York City 
The New York City health agency is a creature of both state law 
and the city charter.  Per the charter, the Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DHMH) has and exercises “all powers of a local 
health department set forth in law.”119  The Board of Health is part of 
DHMH and is its policymaking arm, empowered to add to, amend, or 
repeal the city’s health code “for security of life and health in the 
city.”120  The mayor appoints the commissioner of the Department, 
who must be a doctor of medicine with credentials or experience in 
public health,121 and also serves as a member of the Board.  The other 
ten members of the Board include five members who must be 
experienced physicians and five others who must possess experience 
and credentials in the sciences.122  All are appointed by the mayor and 
serve without pay for six-year terms.123  Whether appointments 
require council approval is not mentioned in the city charter, but the 
 
 114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-3(b) (2013). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. § 2-7(a)(15). 
 117. See, e.g., RYO Cigar Ass’n v. Bos. Pub. Health Comm’n, 950 N.E.2d 889 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding BPHC’s ban on the sale of cigar wraps). 
 118. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. §§ 3-1 to 3-21 (2013); see also, e.g., Policy 
& Practice, Smoke-free Workplaces, CAMBRIDGE PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, 
http://www.cambridgepublichealth.org/policy-practice/policy-advocacy/smoke-free-
workplaces/ (describing how the Cambridge Public Health Department, like the 
BPHC, took action to limit smoking in indoor public places before state law did so). 
 119. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 551. 
 120. Id. § 558(b). 
 121. Id. § 551. 
 122. Id. § 553. 
 123. Id. 
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practice appears to be that the council provides its advice and consent 
to nominations.124  Board members can be removed by the mayor due 
to “official misconduct,” “negligence,” or other unprofessional 
conduct, so long as provided a hearing with counsel if requested.125  
Unlike the BPHC, the DHMH and the Board within it are part of the 
political subdivision that is the city of New York, and, presumably, 
the Board’s changes to the city health code can be overturned or 
modified by the city council.  Yet, as noted above, the City has argued 
in its portion-cap case appeal that the Board exercises plenary 
legislative authority directly delegated by the state legislature.126  This 
argument implies, although the City has not so asserted directly, that 
only the state legislature, and not the city council, has the authority to 
overturn Board-adopted rules. 
3. Washington: King County-Seattle 
One of the more aggressive agencies in enacting public health 
regulations, the King County-Seattle Board of Public Health, or King 
County Board of Health (KCBOH) is a creature of state law, county 
and city code, and county-city agreement.127  The Board consists of 
eleven members, ten of whom vote on policy.128  Three are members 
of the King County council appointed by that council’s chair; three 
are elected officials of Seattle appointed by the city council; and two 
are elected officials from other municipalities within King County 
appointed by the Sound Cities Association.129  The remaining two 
 
 124. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 6, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 654584/12 
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2013). 
 125. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 554. 
 126. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 127. See KING CNTY., WASH., CODE ch. 2.35 (2013); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 3.30.010 (2013) (referring to 1981 agreement between Seattle and King 
County regarding health board composition and department funding); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 70.05.035 (2013) (allowing home-rule county legislative authorities to 
prescribe selection mechanisms for a board of health, but requiring that a majority be 
elected officials); id. § 70.08.010 (establishing framework for “Combined City-County 
Health Departments”). 
 128. KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021 (2013). 
 129. Id. § 2.35.021 (providing that other municipalities agree upon a method of 
selection); Membership Roster of the King County Board of Health, KING COUNTY, 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/BOH/members.aspx [hereinafter, 
KING COUNTY] (noting that the Sound Cities Association appoints the “suburban” 
members).  There are a couple of apparent discrepancies between code and practice.  
The King County Code says only that the “city” of Seattle appoints its members, 
without indicating whether this is done by the mayor or council, but the KCBOH web 
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voting members are “health professionals,” one of whom should have 
“knowledge of environmental health, including knowledge of septic 
systems and groundwater quality,” each appointed with an 
affirmative vote of the prior eight officials totaling at least seven.130  In 
calculating votes of the Board, the three county councilmember’s 
votes are given double weight, thus creating thirteen total votes.131  
All of the elected officials serve terms of just one year, while the 
“health professionals” serve three-year terms.132  There is no express 
provision for removal from office, and it appears that Board members 
are not paid.133  If there were a conflict between a KCBOH rule and 
the legislative desires of King County, Seattle, or another King 
County city, it is unclear whose rule would trump. 
As compared to Boston and New York City, the KCBOH is far 
more regional, encompassing numerous municipalities and 
unincorporated territory.  (Of course, New York City is in a way a 
regional government itself, comprising five counties and eight million-
plus people, as compared to King County’s two million, so the 
comparison is crude.)  With respect to institutional independence, the 
KCBOH’s members are predominantly drawn from elected bodies of 
the county or constituent cities, whereas the BPHC is a separate body 
corporate and the New York City Board is appointed directly by the 
mayor.134  The KCBOH might be less independent than the BPHC, 
but perhaps more independent than the New York City Board 
because many of the KCBOH members are officials elected in their 
own right, and, therefore, presumably less beholden to any other 
elected official.135  Relatedly, insofar as eleven of its thirteen votes are 
cast by members holding other elected office, the KCBOH may have 
 
site says the city council makes the appointments. Id.  The Code also states that the 
county chair appoints county members, KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021.A.1 
(2013), but the KCBOH web site says they are appointed by the county council. KING 
COUNTY, supra. 
 130. KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021.A.4 (2013).  The final, nonvoting 
member is a health professional appointed by a majority vote of the rest of the board. 
Id. 
 131. Id. § 2.35.021.A.1. 
 132. See KING COUNTY, supra note 129. 
 133. See KCBOH CODE § 2.04.020(F) (2013), http://www.kingcounty.gov/ 
healthservices/health/BOH/code.aspx (noting reimbursement only for expenses). 
 134. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the BPHC and the New York City Board 
of Health). 
 135. For instance, the current membership from Seattle includes city councilors, 
including the council president. See KING COUNTY, supra note 129. 
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the most democratic legitimacy, or at least political acumen.136  On the 
other hand, due to its large number of elected officials, none of whom 
need have any expertise in the fields of medicine or public health, the 
KCBOH is much less “expert”-dominated than the BPHC or the New 
York City Board.  Massachusetts towns’ boards are the least 
“expert”-dominated, at least by design, requiring no or little specific 
credentials or experience for members.137 
Before moving on to the more theoretical discussion below, one 
more doctrinal note is in order.  Essential to the administrative 
process’s legitimacy at any level is the extent to which rulemaking is 
transparent and involves the public.  The details of the various 
entities’ rulemaking processes are also determined by an amalgam of 
state and local law.  New York City, for instance, has its own 
administrative procedure act that is codified in the city charter.138  A 
full review of local administrative procedure is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but the more open and transparent the process, the more 
likely the local administrative action will be perceived as legitimate by 
the public, the courts, and other elected officials.  Standard elements 
of process should include the publication of a notice of a public 
hearing, at least one hearing at which members of the public and 
interested parties may testify, and perhaps some response by the 
board to the testimony elicited.139  From anecdotal observations in the 
cases discussed above, it appears that the rulemaking process at the 
local level may not be as thorough—or at least not as drawn-out—as 
the process at the federal level.140 
 
 136. The elected officials’ claim to democratic legitimacy is somewhat weakened 
by the fact that voters elect these officials to general lawmaking bodies, like the city 
council, and not directly to the health board. 
 137. Only Athol requires one (of three) members to be a “professional health 
practitioner.” See ATHOL, MASS., TOWN CHARTER, at § 5-3-9. 
 138. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER §§ 1041–47 (“City Administrative 
Procedure Act”). 
 139. See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE §§ 2.04.140, 
2.04.175 (2013) (describing notice-and-comment process for rule adoption). 
 140. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31 (2013) (requiring only that a 
summary “describ[ing] the substance of any regulation made by a board of health . . . 
be published once in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or town, and such 
publication shall be notice to all persons”); see also infra note 170. 
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III.  LOCAL HEALTH AGENCY RULEMAKING AS WILSONIAN 
RULEMAKING? 
The emerging role of local health agencies as leaders in combating 
obesity and tobacco use raises interesting questions for those who 
study regulation, administrative law, and policy innovation.  This Part 
will largely attempt to cabin the question of local innovation 
generally, focusing more specifically on the uniqueness of the 
innovation that results from local health agencies.  This Part thus 
begins from the premise that the heightened regulation that has 
emerged from the local administrative sphere would not have 
occurred absent agency action.  In other words, if there were only the 
local lawmaking process, some key innovations—such as trans fat 
bans, menu labeling, many tobacco restrictions, and a portion cap on 
soda—would have never emerged or diffused to the degree that they 
have.  As is the case at the state and federal levels, agencies are not 
perfect agents of elected bodies, and their work does not directly 
represent the “will” of the legislature they serve.  For example, a 
major thrust of the portion-cap litigation is that the New York City 
Council did not pass, and never would have passed, the regulation.141  
Notably, the Bloomberg administration did not respond to the trial 
court ruling by seeking to obtain similar legislation from the city 
council.  From the public positions taken by many councilors, it 
appears that any attempt to do so would have been fruitless.142 
If local health agencies are regulating certain powerful industries 
like Big Tobacco,143 the food industry, and the soda industry to a 
 
 141. N.Y. State Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dept. of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 142. See Id. at 204 (citing a letter submitted to Mayor Bloomberg by fourteen 
members of the city council opposing the proposed portion-cap rule); Brief of Amici 
Curiae New York City Council Members, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. 
Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. 653584/12) (brief opposing 
portion-cap rule submitted on behalf of twenty-three (of fifty-one) council members); 
see also Michael M. Grynbaum, In N.A.A.C.P., Soda Industry Finds Ally, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A20 (noting that “several members of the City Council’s 
Black, Latino and Asian Caucus” oppose the rule).  Indeed, perhaps in response to 
the portion-cap litigation, Mayor Bloomberg has rolled out his more recent proposals 
to improve the public health—namely, requiring that retail stores place cigarettes out 
of customer view and raising the legal age for buying tobacco to twenty-one—as 
legislation before the city council rather than as proposed administrative rules. See 
Anemona Hartocollis, City Plan Sets 21 as Legal Age to Buy Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2013, at A1 (discussing both proposals). 
 143. “Big Tobacco” is a somewhat ambiguous term.  For a working definition, see 
Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 3 n.2. 
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greater degree than local elected officials would regulate on their 
own, at least in many prominent instances, what accounts for this 
regulatory zeal?  And is this heightened regulation justified when put 
forward by officials who are less democratically accountable than city 
councilors and mayors?  In many ways, the challenge to the 
Bloomberg soda rule presses these questions to a degree not seen in 
the other challenges to local agency authority since the rule is 
unpopular with many elected officials, the public at large, and, of 
course, the regulated industries.  With respect to the regulated 
industries, in particular, the record of heightened local regulation 
deviates starkly from the public-choice narrative that holds that 
administrative agencies are particularly susceptible to undue 
influence wielded by well-funded industry interest groups. 
A. Public Choice as the “Dominant” Model of Agency 
Action, and Other “Contenders” 
While not “the only game in town,” public-choice scholarship has 
assumed a prominent place in the academic pantheon, particularly as 
a means of describing the administrative process, with most accounts 
focusing on the federal level.144  Briefly put, public choice rejects the 
notion that persons in public positions pursue “the public good,” and 
instead assumes that public officials, like all other persons, rationally 
pursue their own interests.145  Public choice has traditionally taken an 
especially dim view of the administrative process, viewing agency 
officials as prone to manipulation by powerful “special interest 
groups.”146  Under this account, agency action is far more likely to 
benefit special interests than to serve what others might call the 
“public good”—the more weakly held preferences of a diffuse 
majority.147  More recent and nuanced versions of public choice have 
 
 144. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (Daniel A. 
Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) [hereinafter, “RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK”]. 
 145. See Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and 
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 19 (observing that 
public choice theory assumes that “political actors—the individuals, groups, and 
politico-legal institutions that make public law—act on the basis of rational self-
interest”). 
 146. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE 
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 14–25 (2008) (recounting public 
choice’s “cynical” view of administrative regulation). 
 147. Id.; Mashaw, supra note 145, at 23 (“[P]olicies having widely distributed 
benefits and costs will not be adopted even if they would substantially improve 
general welfare.”) (citing Michael Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A THEORY OF 
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modified this dim portrayal of agency decision-making, but the 
conventional public-choice narrative has showed significant staying 
power among a large number of academics.148 
There are a variety of reasons why the standard public-choice 
narrative may be inapplicable in certain local health agency settings.  
Borrowing from Steven Croley, the public-choice explanation for 
administrative agencies favoring powerful interest groups breaks 
down into two arguments.  First, agencies can be expected to conform 
to legislative preferences regarding regulatory outcomes (which 
Croley calls the “legislative dominance” claim of public-choice 
theory), and those preferences result from legislators seeking to 
obtain interest groups’ help with re-election in exchange for favorable 
regulatory treatment (the “legislator motivation” claim).149  Second, 
and alternatively, agencies themselves are inclined to favor certain 
interest groups, irrespective of legislative influence, due to 
pathologies like the “revolving door” of employment between 
regulators and the regulated (the “agency favoritism” claim).150 
At the local level, the legislator motivation and legislative 
dominance claims of public-choice theory may not lead to pro-
industry outcomes for several reasons.  With respect to “legislator 
motivation,” city councilors may not be as motivated to protect or 
promote the tobacco and food industries as their counterparts are at 
higher levels of government.  Why local legislators are differently 
motivated is a question largely outside the scope of this Article, and 
one I have addressed in depth in other work.151  In short, industries 
may have less influence on local legislators for at least a couple of key 
reasons.  The low profile and utter lack of competition in some city 
 
POLITICAL MARKETS (1981)).  In this sense, the public-choice account overlaps with 
the “capture theory” of the administrative process, although there are distinctions 
between the two.  “Capture” generally assumes that agencies are unduly influenced 
by the large industries they seek to regulate, whereas public-choice theory 
acknowledges that any interest group, including but not limited to industry groups, 
may exert a strong influence on the regulatory process.  Capture also frequently 
focuses more on industries obtaining favorable adjudications from agencies, whereas 
public-choice more broadly applies to both rulemaking and adjudication.  For more 
on “capture,” see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1059–67 (1997); Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the 
EPA?  Appraising Marver Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 148. See Introduction, RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 5 (noting the 
increasing “sophisticat[ion]” and “complex[ity]” of public choice models). 
 149. See CROLEY, supra note 146, at 44–48. 
 150. Id. at 48–52. 
 151. See generally Diller, Innovate, supra note 11. 
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legislative elections may make such elections less “price-sensitive,” 
and thereby diminish the relative influence of well-funded industry 
interest groups on legislators’ motives.152  Further, regulation that 
promotes the public health may be closer to the ideological views of 
the local legislators’ constituents than they are to the average views of 
constituents at higher levels of government.153 
Conversely, the interest groups that lobby for public health 
measures may have more clout with city councilors than they do with 
state legislators and members of Congress.  Indeed, public-choice 
theory acknowledges that legislator motivations are driven by interest 
group pressure, and these interest groups include so-called “public 
interest groups” like those that purport to promote the public 
health.154  For a public-choice theorist, these groups are no more 
virtuous than the soda and tobacco industries.  Even on public 
choice’s own terms, however, it is difficult to explain why public 
health groups would be especially powerful at any level of 
government.  They contribute comparatively little to campaigns, 
spend comparatively little on lobbying, and advocate many proposals 
that are unlikely to attract broad public support.155  To be sure, such 
groups may be relatively more influential in the local legislative 
sphere for a variety of reasons, but that is a long way from explaining 
why they have achieved such notable successes in the local 
administrative forum. 
The second prong of the legislative explanation for administrative 
action—the legislative dominance claim—focuses more specifically on 
agency innovation.  If legislative preferences for public health 
regulation are held steady across levels of government (admittedly a 
strained assumption), local health agencies might still regulate more 
aggressively if city councils are less able to “dominate” agencies than 
their legislative counterparts at other levels of government.  The 
elements of institutional design discussed in Part II likely affect the 
degree of dominance a local legislature exercises over its health 
agency.  In Boston, for instance, the BPHC is a completely 
independent entity not subject to the city council’s direct control.  
 
 152. Id. at 40–45. 
 153. Id. at 46–50. 
 154. See id. at 39 (noting that the existence of “public interest” groups 
“jeopardizes” public choice’s claim that interest groups only pursue their members’ 
narrow interests). 
 155. See, e.g., Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 31–33 & n.167 (noting that 
industry groups far outspend public health organizations on lobbying). 
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While the council plays a role in determining the board’s membership 
by approving mayoral appointees, it appears to lack the power to 
overrule BPHC rules, and exercises limited authority over the 
Commission’s budget.156  In New York City, the mayor appoints all of 
the Board of Health’s members, apparently with the advice and 
consent of the council by custom,157 in contrast to the federal model, 
in which high-level agency appointments require Senate confirmation 
by law.158  Other factors that may influence legislative dominance, 
such as the extent to which legislators hold agencies’ feet to the fire 
through hearings and other methods, are likely a matter of local 
political culture.  In short, there may be plausible reasons why some 
big city health authorities may be less beholden to the legislature 
than, say, federal agencies are to Congress. 
It is notable that to the extent that legislative control of health 
agencies is weakened in places like Boston and New York City, 
executive control is strengthened.  Particularly in New York City, the 
mayor’s power to appoint all Board members pivots the usual public-
choice inquiry from legislative motivation to executive motivation.  
Curiously, many public-choice accounts of agency action focus on 
legislators’ interests, but ignore or downplay the degree to which 
elected officials are influenced by interest-group pressure.159  
Similarly, Steven Croley’s critique of the public-choice narrative for 
the federal administrative process emphasizes the importance of 
presidential support, but does not explain what motivates the 
president to provide such support.160  If the public-choice account is to 
have any salience in explaining aggressive public health action by 
local agencies, it must explain why mayors like Michael Bloomberg 
are motivated to promote the public health at the expense of well-
funded interest groups like the food, soda, and tobacco industries. 
There may be plausible explanations.  In Bloomberg’s case, his 
immense fortune no doubt enables him to pursue goals that are less 
 
 156. See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-8(c) (2013) (allowing the mayor to 
“approve” or “reject” the BPHC’s proposed budget). 
 157. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices:  Delays in Staffing Top 
Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 924, 926 (2009) (noting that, in 2008, there 
were 1141 federal positions requiring Senate confirmation, including all “principal 
officers,” as required by the Constitution). 
 159. See Mashaw, supra note 145, at 36 (noting that “critical actors,” like the 
President, are often missing from the public-choice discussion). 
 160. See CROLEY, supra note 146, at 275–77, 302 (noting the importance of White 
House support in protecting agencies’ decisions from Congressional backlash). 
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available to other politicians who rely to a much greater extent on 
campaign contributions to retain office.161  Freed from such demands, 
Bloomberg can pursue goals that are less obviously “rational,” but 
that might still fit in the modern public-choice framework, such as 
promoting his national profile and enhancing his ego.162  For Boston, 
on the other hand, insofar as Mayor Thomas Menino appointed 
officials to the BPHC who aggressively promoted public health, 
another explanation would be required.  Perhaps the explanation lies 
in the exceptional longevity of his mayoral tenure.163 
As for public choice’s alternative claim of “agency favoritism,” 
there may be reasons why local agencies are less hospitable to the 
food, soda, and tobacco industries than higher-level agencies.  Local 
agencies may be more removed from the “revolving door” culture of 
lobbyists, lawyer, and think tanks that some commentators accuse of 
poisoning agency work at the federal level.164  The requirement of 
expertise for at least some members of the policymaking boards of 
local health agencies may minimize the degree to which political 
“hacks” influence the rulemaking process.165  Agency culture may also 
play a role.  Indeed, consistent with public choice’s premise that all 
persons, including those who serve in regulatory roles, promote their 
own self-interest, there is a longstanding, if now somewhat 
discredited, public-choice account for heightened regulation.  
Administrators might prefer enhanced regulation, the story goes, 
 
 161. Forbes, for instance, estimates Bloomberg’s net worth to be $31 billion as of 
October 2013. The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/ 
michael-bloomberg/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 162. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of 
the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 309, 320–24 (2002) (discussing the “deep ambivalence within public choice 
scholarship about whether the interests that constitute self-interest . . . are limited to 
material matters, or whether they extend to such discarnate concerns as power, 
prestige, and leisure”). 
 163. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Beloved but Ill, Boston Mayor Won’t 
Run Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, at A11 (noting that upon the end of his final 
term, Menino will have been Boston’s mayor for twenty straight years). 
 164. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 507, 510 & n.13, 512–16 (recounting the “revolving door indictment” against 
agencies popular in academic literature, including among public choice scholars). 
 165. Requiring agency members to have certain professional qualifications, 
however, is not unique to the local level. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS app. (2008) 
(listing numerous examples of high-ranking federal agency appointments that require 
specific qualifications by statute). 
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because it increases their power and budgets.166  The sum of this tour 
de public choice is that for those who embrace its descriptive power, 
there is much work to be done to explain why certain local agencies 
have been at the forefront of public health regulation.  Public-choice 
tools might help explain why local agencies have been more 
aggressive than their higher-level counterparts, but clearly, the 
standard public-choice narrative, with its gloomy description of 
agencies hemmed in by powerful industry groups, is a weaker 
affirmative explanation for the regulatory record of many local public 
health agencies. 
While public choice is perhaps the most prominent academic 
account of agency action, there are other “contenders” that I will 
address briefly here.  A strong strain of local government scholarship 
roots itself in the civic republican tradition;167 likewise, some 
administrative law scholars have turned to civic republicanism as a 
justification for the administrative state.168 There is a potential 
overlap, therefore, in these two accounts, focusing on the local 
administrative forum.  For reasons explained elsewhere, I am a 
skeptic of the civic republican (or its conceptual sibling, the 
communitarian) argument for local innovation generally.169  Big-city 
innovations like the portion-cap rule only bolster this skepticism for a 
couple of reasons.  First, the amount of public “deliberation” before 
and during these policies’ adoption was minimal.170  Second, the fact 
 
 166. See Mashaw, supra note 145, at 36 (recounting William Niskanen’s claim of 
“budget maximization,” and the ensuing criticism thereof).  For more on this claim, 
see infra note 183). 
 167. See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and 
Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
137, 152–57 (2008) (making normative argument for a civic republican model of local 
government). 
 168. The seminal piece here is Mark Seidenfeld’s A Civic Republican Justification 
for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 169. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 44–45.  For criticism of the civic 
republican account in the administrative context, see CROLEY, supra note 146, at 62–
65 (faulting the civic republican narrative for being “vague with respect to exactly 
who participates [in administrative decision-making] and what their behavioral 
motivations are”). 
 170. See, e.g., N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (noting that 
the rule was proposed on June 12, 2012, with public comments due in writing or at a 
hearing held on July 24, 2012); Michael M. Grynbaum, Strong Words from Both 
Sides at a Hearing on Bloomberg’s Soda Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at A19 
(observing that “few of the dozens of speakers who turned out at [the] hearing . . . 
represented the average soda-drinker on the street,” and identifying, “more or less,” 
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that New York City, whose population of eight million-plus exceeds 
that of all but eleven states, has been at the forefront of such 
innovation in the administrative sphere complicates the civic 
republican account, given that the Big Apple is hardly the New 
England township of Tocquevillian lore so romanticized by 
communitarians.171  Perhaps civic republicans would have better luck 
explaining some of the innovations adopted by health boards in small 
Massachusetts towns like Athol, Barnstable, and Yarmouth. 
The other account for agency action generally that is worth noting 
as a contrast to the public-choice school is Steven Croley’s forceful 
argument that administrators are capable of regulating for the public 
good.  Croley argues that the arduous processes federal law requires 
of administrative action, combined with rigorous executive and 
judicial review, can provide the right setting for rules that serve the 
public good.172  As a rebuttal of the public-choice school as applied to 
any level of government, Croley’s work is most valuable.  As an 
affirmative account for local administrative rulemaking, however, 
Croley’s account, which focuses solely on the federal administrative 
system, is less helpful.  Because Croley focuses on the rigorous 
process for regulating at the federal level, his argument has less 
salience at the local level where the procedural requirements may be 
less robust.173  Further, and more fundamentally, much of what Croley 
likes about the federal administrative process is that it involves the 
public and, ultimately, can promulgate rules that the public 
supports.174  As a defense of local administrative action like New York 
City’s portion-cap rule, Croley’s account falters, since the rule lacks 
public support.175  While the portion-cap rule may be the starkest 
example of an unpopular agency rule, others, like the trans fat ban, 
met some degree of public skepticism before ultimately gaining 
 
those testifying against the rule as representatives of either the soda industry or its 
affiliates and those testifying in favor of the rule as academics and health 
professionals). 
 171. See New York (City), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (estimating the 2012 
population of New York City to be 8,336,697). 
 172. See generally CROLEY, supra note 146. 
 173. See, e.g., supra note 170. 
 174. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 146, at 256 (noting that various examples of 
“socially beneficial regulation” “enjoyed public acceptance, or at least generated no 
public opposition”). 
 175. See Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda 
Ban, Calling it an Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, 
at A19. 
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acceptance.176  To defend at least some of the rules that local health 
agencies have issued, particularly in the realm of obesity prevention, 
one needs a justification that depends less on popular opinion.  For 
that more expert-based—and perhaps elitist—account, this paper now 
turns to Woodrow Wilson. 
B. The Wilsonian Administrative State 
Writing as a political scientist, before he would achieve far more 
notoriety as governor of New Jersey and then President of the United 
States, Woodrow Wilson made the case for the “scientific” 
administration of government.177  Rooted in the Progressive 
movement’s push for civil service reform, Wilson believed that 
scientific administration by trained experts who did not owe their 
appointment to politicians would make government more efficient 
and businesslike, and therefore more able to serve the public good.178  
By “scientific,” Wilson did not mean a government administered by 
physicists and biologists, but rather that the administration of 
government be treated like a science (as political science had been 
before it) and then staffed by those trained in its methods.179  Wilson’s 
argument was in some ways a call for the establishment of schools 
dedicated to training public administrators that are now common in 
universities, but were unheard-of at the time.180  Wilson looked to 
 
 176. While I was unable to find a poll testing public reaction to the trans fat ban in 
New York City or any other jurisdiction, the media commentary regarding proposed 
bans was often quite negative, in New York City and elsewhere. E.g., John Tierney, 
One Cook Too Many, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A15 (“This is the biggest step yet 
in turning the Big Apple into the Big Nanny.”); see also Brittany Schaeffer, No Fries 
for You!, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-
6206-no_fries_for_you_.html (noting “[f]ears of overzealous government regulation” 
and warning readers, disingenuously, to “[e]at your doughnuts while you still can” as 
Multnomah County, Ore., considered adopting a trans fat ban). But see Roni Caryn 
Rabin, Calorie Labels May Clarify Options, Not Actions, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/health/nutrition/17cons.html?pagewanted=print 
(citing a 2005 poll finding that eighty-three percent of consumers wanted nutritional 
information in restaurants, which the author took as overwhelming support for menu 
labeling). 
 177. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, in WOODROW WILSON: 
THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL WRITINGS 231, 234 (Ronald J. Pestritto ed., 2005) 
(“[T]here should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the 
paths of government . . . .”). 
 178. See id. at 231–34. 
 179. See id. at 232–34, 240. 
 180. See, e.g., About WWS: History, PRINCETON UNIV. WOODROW WILSON SCH. 
OF PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS, http://wws.princeton.edu/about_wws/history/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2013) (noting that the school was created in 1930 “in the spirit of Woodrow 
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Continental Europe as an inspiration for scientific governmental 
administration, but was sensitive to the challenge of importing its 
model to the American democratic system.181  To that end, Wilson 
acknowledged a role for politics and public opinion to supervise 
governmental decisions at an abstract level, but urged that 
administrators be given broad discretion to implement these plans as 
they saw fit.182  Wilson is now considered the leading early advocate of 
the modern American administrative state, even if his vision of an 
apolitical civil service promoting the public good had more classical 
antecedents,183 and is frequently derided by contemporary scholars as 
naïve.184 
Other prominent social scientists of the early twentieth century like 
Frank Goodnow and Max Weber reinforced Wilson’s vision of a 
“more rational, less political government” in their writings.185  Their 
views were further refined during the New Deal by defenders of the 
rapidly expanding administrative state like James Landis.  Landis 
argued that specialized agencies were well-positioned to enact better 
policy, and less likely to be influenced by “impertinent 
considerations” (like politics) when doing so.186  To some extent, 
Kenneth Culp Davis carried on the intellectual torch from Wilson and 
Landis, defending broad delegations to agencies as necessary given 
 
Wilson’s interest in preparing students for leadership in public and international 
affairs”). 
 181. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 235–37 (discussing administration in France 
and Prussia). 
 182. See id. at 243 (discussing the “proper relations between public opinion and 
administration”). 
 183. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 193 (1971) (noting that the view that “honest men insulated from 
political and economic pressure will act in the public interest . . . derives from 
Confucius and Plato and has dominated the modern literature on public 
administration since Woodrow Wilson”). 
 184. E.g., id.; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the 
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99 & n.12 (2000) (citing Wilson as “[t]he most 
famous American advocate of an apolitical scientific administration,” which “naively 
assumed away political influence in the administrative process”). 
 185. David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 397, 405 & nn.18–19 (2002) (citing works of Goodnow and Weber). 
 186. Id. at 405 & nn.21–23 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS (1938)); see also Merrill, supra note 147, at 1056 (citing Landis as “the most 
obvious example” of a “neo-progressive[] who thought that the answer to interest 
group influence was to insulate expert administrative agencies from ordinary 
politics”). 
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Congress’s inability to grapple with minute details and complex 
scientific questions better left to experts in the relevant field.187 
Although the Wilsonian vision of administrative agencies has lived 
on to some extent, public choice has largely eclipsed it in the 
academic world.  For public-choice scholars, the “early Progressives” 
like Wilson “merely succeeded in transferring political bargaining 
from the legislative arena . . . to the administrative arena.”188  Because 
public choice rejects the notion of any individual pursuing the public 
good—or even the notion of a public good outright—the idea that an 
agency might remain apolitical, much less that an apolitical agency 
will create better policy, is utterly fanciful.  As a partial heir to the 
Wilsonian school, Steven Croley rejects the public-choice account and 
offers his more process-based argument for the administrative state.189  
Croley, however, believes that the administrative process will result in 
rules that enjoy public support.  Croley, therefore, hopes that the 
administrative process will achieve the political success that Wilson so 
deliberately eschewed, and in that respect departs from Wilson’s 
emphasis on scientific, technocratic rulemaking. 
C. The New York City Portion-Cap Rule as Wilsonian 
Rulemaking? 
For supporters of local public health regulation, the Wilsonian 
vision of administrative rulemaking offers a compelling narrative for 
the kind of innovation that has occurred at the local level.  In this 
regard, the New York City portion-cap rule stands out as perhaps the 
archetypal example of Wilsonian rulemaking on the local level.  The 
rule is “scientific,” beneficial to the public health, and almost 
certainly would not have emerged from the ordinary political process.  
Legions of empirical data demonstrate that individual consumption 
patterns are influenced by serving sizes.190  Substantial empirical study 
 
 187. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 26 (1982) (citing Davis as an “adhere[nt]” of “a Wilsonian view of 
administrative government”) (citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 3.15, at 206–07 (2d ed. 1978)); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 12–13 (3d ed. 1972) (arguing that a legislative body is 
“ill suited for . . . applying to shifting and continuing problems the ideas supplied by 
scientists or other professional advisers”). 
 188. Aranson et al., supra note 187, at 26. 
 189. See supra notes 172–72 and accompanying text. 
 190. See generally, Nicole Diliberti et al., Increased Portion Size Leads to 
Increased Energy Intake in a Restaurant Meal, 12 OBESITY RES. 562 (2004); Lisa R. 
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shows that increased consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages, 
influenced in part by the “super-sizing” of soda and other sugar-rich, 
nutrient-poor beverages, has contributed to the meteoric rise in 
obesity in the United States over the last thirty years, as well as to 
other health problems like coronary disease and dental caries.191  It is 
reasonable, therefore, for health experts to conclude that mandated 
decreases in portion sizes, even if avoidable with additional effort, 
might decrease the consumption of obesogenic beverages, and 
thereby make a dent in the obesity rate in New York City and 
beyond.192 
Despite the public health-based argument for limiting portion sizes, 
the rule is one that the political system at any level of government is 
unlikely to adopt.  The rule was immediately unpopular with the New 
York City public and many public officials, attracting significant 
mockery from the popular media and commentators.193  Perhaps more 
importantly, the rule aroused the ire of—by threatening 
economically—not just the powerful soda industry, but also its allies 
(on this issue, at least) like the fast-food industry, other retailers, and 
 
Young, The Contribution of Expanding Portion Sizes to the US Obesity Epidemic, 
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 246 (2002). 
 191. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN OBESITY PREVENTION:  
SOLVING THE WEIGHT OF THE NATION 167 (Dan Glickman et al. eds., 2012) 
(identifying sugary drinks as “the single largest contributor of calories and added 
sugars to the American diet”); K.E. Heller et al., Sugared Soda Consumption and 
Dental Caries in the United States, 80 J. DENTAL RES. 1949 (2001) (finding 
significant associations between soda consumption and decayed, missing, or filled 
surfaces of teeth for persons over twenty-five years of age); Vasanti S. Malik et al., 
Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review, 84 
AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 274 (2006) (“The weight of epidemiologic and 
experimental evidence indicates that a greater consumption of SSBs is associated 
with weight gain and obesity.”); Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have 
Sweetened Beverages Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic?, 14 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 499 (2010) (concluding that sweetened beverage intake “has made a 
substantive contribution to the obesity epidemic experienced in the USA in recent 
decades”). 
 192. See N.Y.C DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE 
OF AN ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.53) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK 
CITY HEALTH CODE (2012) available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/ 
pdf/notice/2012/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf. 
 193. See, e.g., Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 175 (reporting that sixty percent 
of New York City residents opposed the rule); The Daily Show with Jon Stewart:  
Drink Different (Comedy Central broadcast May 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-may-31-2012/drink-different (mocking the 
rule). 
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unions.194  Politically influential groups like the NAACP,195 which 
receives significant financial support from the soda industry, also 
publicly opposed the rule.196  Industry groups immediately spent over 
a million dollars advertising against the rule even before the Board of 
Health approved it, hoping to shape and solidify public dislike of the 
rule.197  While super-rich, term-limited Mayor Bloomberg was 
impervious to the industry’s assault, one wonders whether a majority 
of city councilors, had the council enacted such a policy by ordinance, 
would have withstood such a barrage.198  On the other hand, as 
unpaid, appointed volunteers, many of whom have public health and 
medical credentials, the Board’s members were probably less likely to 
waver than city councilors in the wake of industry and public 
opposition.  For all of these reasons, the Board’s rule seemed to fit 
the mold of Wilsonian rulemaking even if the portion cap’s impact on 
public health was empirically indeterminate at the time of the rule’s 
adoption.199 
 
 194. See, e.g., Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 175 (noting that the American 
Beverage Association’s members stood to lose millions from the implementation of 
the rule and launched a “big-budget public-relations effort” to oppose it). 
 195. The New York State Conference of the NAACP filed an amicus brief 
opposing the portion-cap rule, see Brief of Amici Curiae N.Y. State Conf. of NAACP 
et al. at 1, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 25, 
2013) (No, 653584/12), and the national president of the NAACP, Benjamin Jealous, 
publicly opposed the rule as well, Sal Gentile & Allison Koch, NAACP President 
Comes Out Against Blocked NYC Soda Ban, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/51207127/t/naacp-president-comes-out-against-blocked-
nyc-soda-ban/#.Ud3p5234Jvo. 
 196. See Grynbaum, supra note 142 (describing the NAACP’s “close ties to big 
soft-drink companies, particularly Coca-Cola,” which donated “tens of thousands of 
dollars” to an NAACP health education program). 
 197. Michael M. Grynbaum, In Soda Fight, Industry Focuses on the Long Run, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A28 (citing example of “New Yorkers for Beverage 
Choices,” a soda industry-sponsored group, that “spent more than $1 million on a 
public-relations campaign against” the rule before implementation). 
 198. By way of comparison, the San Francisco city council held firm after enacting 
an ordinance restricting toy giveaways with children’s meals of low nutritional quality 
(often imprecisely and pejoratively referred to as a “Happy Meal ban”), San 
Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 290-10 (codified at SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH 
CODE §§ 471.1-471.9), despite significant media ridicule of the regulation. See The 
Daily Show with Jon Stewart: San Francisco’s Happy Meal Ban (Comedy Central 
broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-
january-3-2011/san-francisco-s-happy-meal-ban (mocking the ordinance in an 
interview with San Francisco City Supervisor Eric Mar). 
 199. Indeed, an empirical study released after the portion-cap rule’s aborted 
implementation purports to demonstrate that the rule would not have reduced 
consumption, because consumers would instead buy bundles of servings that exceed 
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In other ways, however, the Board’s promulgation of the portion-
cap rule fell short of the Wilsonian ideal.  As stressed by the rule’s 
opponents, the Board of Health did not independently conjure up the 
rule.  Rather, Mayor Bloomberg’s office proposed the rule, which the 
Board then adopted verbatim, thus undercutting the Wilsonian 
argument for deference to the Board’s scientific expertise.200  That the 
mayor appoints all of the Board’s members likely further weakened 
any claim by the Board to being an apolitical body focused on 
scientific solutions.  Combined with the Board’s apparent lack of 
deliberation regarding the mayor’s proposal, the New York judiciary 
has thus far adjudged the rule as much an executive power-grab as an 
attempt to regulate for the public health of New Yorkers. 
The mere fact that an agency board collaborates with an elected 
official, even one who appoints its members, should not ipso facto 
nullify the legitimacy of the resultant rule.  After all, the members of 
the New York City Board possess a broad degree of expertise in the 
fields of medicine or health.201  Presumably they played at least a 
screening function in approving Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal.  
Moreover, requiring every local health agency to demonstrate that it 
thought of every rule on its own would impose a needless burden on 
local rulemaking.  It would also limit policy diffusion by preventing 
local health agencies from borrowing other jurisdictions’ innovations 
without re-inventing the regulatory wheel.  Indeed, any flaws in the 
New York City Board’s rulemaking process from a Wilsonian 
perspective do not necessarily justify judicial invalidation of the 
portion-cap rule.  They simply demonstrate that, to lay better claim to 
the Wilsonian mantle, more agency independence in design and 
practice would be helpful.  In this regard, the BPHC’s status as a 
 
the rule’s portion cap. See Brent M. Wilson et al., Regulating the Way to Obesity:  
Unintended Consequences of Limiting Sugary Drink Sizes, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2013, 
at 2.  The study, however, measured only the amount of beverage purchased rather 
than consumed, and assumes that consumers will be offered bundled servings in a 
convenient fashion. See id. 
 200. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 
(noting that Mayor Bloomberg initially announced the portion-cap rule); id. at 213 
(“[T]he rule was drafted, written and proposed by the Office of the Mayor and 
submitted to the Board, which enacted it without any substantive changes.”). 
 201. See supra notes 121 and 122 and accompanying text; see also Brief for 
Respondents-Appellants at 6–7, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505 
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 654584/12) (listing the impressive professional 
credentials of the Board’s members). 
DILLER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:14 PM 
1898 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
separate body corporate, along with the clear requirement of city 
council confirmation of its members, may be preferable. 
The New York Statewide Coalition court also faulted the Board’s 
portion-cap rule for not being Wilsonian enough in a different way.  
In holding that the rule amounted to unconstitutional legislation as 
opposed to permissible interstitial administrative rulemaking, the 
Appellate Division asked whether the agency acted “solely” within its 
area of expertise.202  Under the Court of Appeals precedent of Boreali 
v. Axelrod, whether an agency considers “political, social, and 
economic” concerns outside of its “technical” area of expertise is a 
“circumstance” indicating potential usurpation of the legislative 
role.203  In applying this Boreali “factor,” the Appellate Division 
faulted the Board for various inconsistencies in the portion-cap 
rule.204  The rule, for instance, did not apply to alcoholic beverages 
and certain milk, fruit, and coffee drinks.205  The rule also applied only 
to some retail establishments, like restaurants, movie theaters, and 
stadiums, but not to others, like grocery and convenience stores.206  
The City claimed that the rule exempted grocery and convenience 
stores because the state’s Department of Agriculture, rather than the 
City’s Board of Health, has jurisdiction to regulate them.207  To the 
Appellate Division, however, the exceptions based on practical and 
jurisdictional concerns indicated that the Board unduly balanced 
social and economic considerations in promulgating the rule.208  In a 
similar vein, the trial court held that these various exceptions 
rendered the rule “arbitrary and capricious.”209 
Whatever the doctrinal garb, faulting the Board as a legal matter 
for considering practical concerns in promulgating the portion-cap 
rule is misguided.  If, by requiring agencies to operate only within 
their areas of expertise, it reflects an embrace of Wilsonian 
 
 202. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 212–13. 
 203. 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1351, 1355 (N.Y. 1987). 
 204. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 207 (referring to Boreali’s self-
described “circumstances” as “factors”). 
 205. Id. at 205. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 209–10. 
 208. Id. at 210 (“[T]he selective restrictions enacted by the Board . . . reveal that 
the health of the residents of New York City was not its sole concern.”). 
 209. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2013) (“[The rule] is arbitrary and capricious because it applies to some but 
not all food establishments in the City [and] excludes other beverages that have 
significantly higher concentrations of sugar sweeteners . . . .”). 
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rulemaking, it is an unworkable hyper-Wilsonianism.  Wilson wanted 
agencies to be more “scientific” than the political branches, but he did 
not expect them to be completely immune to practical and political 
considerations.210  That they might consider social, economic, 
jurisdictional, and political implications in tempering the scope of 
their rules is not inconsistent with his vision.  The Appellate 
Division’s approach, by contrast, requires that agencies willfully 
ignore real-world concerns like a rule’s public acceptance or practical 
enforceability.  As the dissent in Boreali pointed out, such a view of 
the agency rulemaking process is simply unworkable.211  Moreover, 
faulting the rule for its exceptions is inconsistent with the widely 
accepted notion that the government may attempt to regulate away a 
problem in piecemeal fashion.212  The judicial decisions in the portion-
cap litigation thus far are the distasteful fruit of Boreali’s tree of 
reasoning.213  For the portion-cap rule to be upheld, the New York 
Court of Appeals may have to reconsider this curious precedent. 
In addition to the legal challenge to the portion-cap rule, the rule 
has been subject to a ferocious “cultural attack” by the popular press, 
political commentators, and comedians of varied political stripes.  
The New York Post referred to Michael Bloomberg as the “Soda 
Jerk”;214 Jon Stewart, Bill Maher, and Glenn Beck all railed against 
the portion cap;215 and even the venerable New York Times 
applauded the trial court’s decision invalidating the rule.216  In 
 
 210. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 243 (contending that “public opinion” is 
“indispensable” and should play the role of “authoritative critic” in “superintending” 
administration). 
 211. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1359–60 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority opinion for requiring the agency to “pristinely premise[]” its 
rule on public health concerns, as “[l]ife and government are not so neatly 
categorized”). 
 212. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (rejecting federal 
equal protection challenge to government regulation where regulation takes “one 
step at a time,” and noting that “[t]he legislature may select one phase of one field 
and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”). 
 213. See also supra notes 82–100 and accompanying text (discussing Boreali’s 
influence on New York Statewide Coalition). 
 214. Soda Jerk!, N.Y. POST, Feb. 24, 2013, at 1. 
 215. Worst Mayor Ever:  Bloomberg’s Soda Ban Passes 9-0, GLENN BECK (Sept. 
13, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://www.glennbeck.com/2012/09/13/worst-mayor-ever-
bloomberg%E2%80%99s-soda-ban-passes-9-0/; Real Time with Bill Maher (HBO 
Broadcast Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/ 
03/16/maher_bloombergs_ban_on_sodas_makes_liberals_look_bad.html; The Daily 
Show, supra note 184. 
 216. Editorial, Mayor Bloomberg’s Anti-Obesity Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2013, at A24. 
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criticizing the rule, much of the invective focused on Mayor 
Bloomberg himself, demonstrating that for the public, the rule was 
hardly seen as the work of an independent body of experts, but rather 
the brainchild of a politician who has become particularly well-known 
for public health crusades.  Moreover, the rule tapped into a deep 
vein of resentment of any governmental intrusion on perceived 
“freedom to choose” what and how much to eat and drink.217  Much 
of the public clearly either does not understand or does not agree 
with the scientific findings that “choice” is very much determined by a 
consumer’s environment.218  Indeed, the Appellate Division faulted 
the Board for even considering behavioral economics in promulgating 
the rule.219  For the obesity prevention movement to succeed, it will 
need to work much harder on educating the public in this regard.  
With respect to a restriction on food or beverage choice that is 
perceived as more tangible than, say, the trans fat ban (which did not 
ban any particular food or quantity of food, but just a particular 
ingredient), the American public appears less willing to defer to 
scientific experts. 
CONCLUSION 
While they may be awkward doctrinal creatures, local public health 
agencies are increasingly at the vanguard of regulatory strategies to 
curb tobacco use and obesity.  In a handful of states, their broad 
powers have allowed them to do as much, if not more, than elected 
local officials in that regard.  Should courts and elected officials trust 
these unelected—yet sometimes expert—agencies’ judgments even 
when unpopular?  Hopefully, the answer is at least a qualified yes, not 
simply because there may be some normative merit to the Wilsonian 
vision of administrative rulemaking, but because local agencies’ 
actions have destabilized and reshaped public opinion over time.  For 
instance, while public opinion in New York and elsewhere may have 
 
 217. For an interesting discussion of whether the federal Constitution protects such 
choices, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 738 (2013) 
(concluding that there is no such constitutional protection generally). 
 218. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 
53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1698–99 (2004); Paul A. Diller, Combating Obesity with a Right 
to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 985–86 (2013). 
 219. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (“[T]he 
Board’s decision effectively relies upon the behavioral economics concept that 
consumers are pushed into better behavior when certain choices are made less 
convenient.”). 
DILLER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:14 PM 
2013] LOCAL HEALTH AGENCIES 1901 
been cool to the trans fat ban initially,220 this regulation is now taken 
in stride and appears to have succeeded at lowering the health risks 
associated with eating fast food.221  Similarly, while the portion-cap 
rule may have been a shock initially, New Yorkers—and others—
might warm to the idea eventually if it is allowed to proceed and is 
implemented smoothly.  Depriving agencies of the ability to get out in 
front of public opinion would remove, at least in the public health 
sphere, a significant weapon from the arsenal of government action, 
particularly when the regulated industries wield significance influence 
over elected officials at higher levels of government through 
campaign contributions and lobbying.  As public-choice theorists 
would readily acknowledge, “democracy” is easily throttled by 
entrenched defenders of the regulatory status quo.  Sometimes elite 
experts, more insulated from the rough-and-tumble of politics, are the 
persons most capable of breaking that status quo.  Their work will 
stake a better claim to legitimacy when their independence and 
expertise are less impeachable, and the public perceives their 
rulemaking as more than the rubber-stamping of an elected 
politician’s policy idea. 
 
 220. See supra note 176. 
 221. See Sonia Y. Angell et al., Change in Trans Fatty Acid Content of Fast-Food 
Purchases Associated with New York City’s Restaurant Regulation, 157 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 81 (2012). 
